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DEFINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN TERMS
OF REGULATORY NECESSITY
STUART A. SHORENSTEIN AND LORNA VERALDI*
From the time of the 1934 enactment of the Communications
Act, its touchstone has been the "public interest, convenience and
necessity."' The phrase, as applied to broadcasters, would
provide the rationale for a regulatory regimen designed to ensure
that government licenses were used to serve the public and that
qualified operators of those licenses used that privilege for public
benefit. If not, the privilege could be taken away. For more than
a half century the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
was the veritable tail that wagged the industry's dog as a
sometimes heavy regulatory hand permeated nearly every aspect
of station ownership, operation and control.
There has been considerable debate over just what Congress
intended when, in creating a single agency to regulate both wired
and wireless communication, it borrowed the standard of "public
interest, convenience, and necessity" from predecessor statutes
governing telephony2 and radio.3  Over the years most
*Stuart A. Shorenstein is a partner in the New York office of Wolf, Block, Schorr and
Sols-Cohen, LLP and chair of its Communications Practice Group. He received a B.A.
degree from Duke University (1968) and a J.D. degree from New York University School
of Law (1971). Lorna Veraldi is Associate Professor in the School of Journalism and Mass
Communication, Florida International University. She received a B.A. degree from
Eastern Montana College (1970), an M.A. degree in communications from the University
of Utah (1976), and a J.D. degree from New York Law School (1981).
1 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 655, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
2 Prior to 1934, wired communications including telephone had been under the
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission and subject to regulation as a
common carrier, linked to railroad regulation because phone lines were typically strung
along railroad rights-of-way and along publicly financed roads. Telephony, like railroads.
stage coaches and canal boats, was deemed to be a business "affected with a public
interest," and subject to operation under state or federal certificates of "convenience and
necessity." See e.g. William J. Byrnes, Telecommunications Regulation: Something Old
and Something New, THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MAJOR
AMENDMENTS, 1934-1996, 31, 31-33, (Max D. Paglin ed., 1999). See also Glen 0.
Robinson, Title I The Federal Communications Act An Essay on Origins and Regulatory
Purpose, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, 3, 3-8 (Max D.
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interpretations have focused on "public interest," to the exclusion
of "convenience" or "necessity." Perhaps that was because
"convenience and necessity" had merely tagged along with
"public interest" when it was lifted from common carrier
regulatory contexts that did not readily apply to the competitive
broadcast industry. Newton Minow recalls that when he first
became FCC chairman in 1961, he asked Washington's former
Senator Clarence C. Dill (who had been the leading Senate
sponsor of the Radio Act of 1927 and an active participant in the
debate over the Communications Act of 1934)4 what legislators
had meant by "the public interest."5 Senator Dill, long since
retired, told Minow
that he and his colleagues ... knew they had to have some
legal standard with which to award licenses to some people
while rejecting others, because there were not enough
channels to go around. "A young man on the committee staff
had worked at the Interstate Commerce Commission for
several years," Dill recalled, "and he said, 'Well, how about
"public interest, convenience and necessity"? That's what we
used there.' That sounded pretty good, so we decided we
would use it, too."6
Certainly, whatever the Congressional intent had been in
adopting "public interest, convenience and necessity" as the
standard under which a competitive broadcast industry would be
regulated, legislators had not intended to invoke "necessity" in its
traditional and theretofore used sense-under which regulated
common carriers like railroads had to demonstrate the
"necessity" of offering a duplicative service-on the theory that
unnecessary duplication would provide no benefit to consumers,
but would force them to bear the extra costs of construction.7
"Necessity" in the context of broadcast regulation went undefined
and largely forgotten as the FCC, the industry, consumers and
Paglin ed., 1989).
3 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (establishing Federal
Radio Commission and granting it authority to regulate radio broadcasting).
4 See Robinson, supra note 2, at 11-23.
5 See NEWTON N. MINOW AND CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND, 4
(1995) (noting that author approached Senator Dill, draftsmen of Communications Act of
1934, and asked Senator what he meant by "public interest").
6 Seeid.
7 See Robinson, supra note 2, at 15.
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even the courts spoke in shorthand about the meaning of "public
interest."8
Indeed, former FCC Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson has
suggested that in the absence of any general presumption
against competition, a common sense reading would reduce
"public interest, convenience and necessity" to "public
interestconvenience." 9  Moreover, notes Robinson, Congress
appears to have used the conjunctive and the disjunctive
interchangeably and "quite casually" in different sections of the
Communications Act-sometimes referring to "public interest,
convenience, and necessity," sometimes to "public interest,
convenience, or necessity," without much apparent justification
for the choice in the context.1
It was not until passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
that the Congress would undertake a major overhaul of the 1934
statute. The 1996 statute, while it retained the phrase "public
interest, convenience and necessity" as the broad mandate
pursuant to which the FCC was to regulate broadcasting,
perhaps inadvertently, also may have breathed life into the
formerly gratuitous "necessity," creating in the process a new
touchstone for FCC regulatory power."I Deregulatory in spirit,
the 1996 statute and recent court interpretations suggest that
the "necessity" of regulation could now become the new litmus by
which the FCC is to implement and the courts are to weigh
regulation in the "public interest, convenience and necessity."
8 Interpretations of its meaning have run the gamut from what has been described as
"Deliver the Mail" to "Holy Grail." Under the first view, public interest is served when
the FCC performs "neutral, mechanical, logistical functions," aimed at preventing
technical interference. Under the second, public interest is served when the FCC pursues
"some grand, moral, civilizing goal," aimed at shaping content in socially desirable ways.
See Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Public Interest" Standard: The Search
for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L. J. 605, 606 (1998). Some would argue that the
standard is so broad as to be meaningless and thus an impermissible delegation of
Congressional powers to an unelected regulatory agency. See, e.g., Randolph J. May, The
Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate to Be Constitutional?53 FED. COMM. L.
J. 427 (2001). Others suggest that it was intended to give the FCC broad and flexible
powers to advance with direct and indirect regulation broadcast content attuned to
desirable social goals.
9 Robinson, supra note 2, at 15-16.
10 See id. at 16.
11 See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
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THE FCC's OWNERSHIP RULES
To promote the twin "public interest" goals of diversity and
competition, the FCC early in its history adopted regulations
severely limiting the number of radio and television stations that
any one party could own either nationally or within a local
market. For decades these rules were strictly enforced, rarely
waived and highly restrictive. Over time, however, the growth of
FM radio in the 1970s and 1980s and the expansion of the total
number of radio stations to over 10,000 created a highly
competitive marketplace that enhanced program diversity
through niche programming formats. At the same time the
technological engine of development created alternative,
competitive means of program delivery that gradually and
steadily eroded the major networks' market dominance of the
television industry. In the video marketplace, the growth of
subscriber-based industries like cable TV, the development of
direct broadcast satellite and the advent of the internet provided
alternative attractions to the consumer and lessened the grip of
television's major networks over the audience.12 From 1970 to the
present, the networks' share of the prime time audience has
gradually dropped from 95% to less than 50%.13 Faced with such
competitive pressures, the broadcast industry urged Congress
and the FCC to relax the shackles of heavy regulation so
broadcasters could better compete with new industries that were
subject to lesser regulation. The pretext for deregulating
broadcasting was that over-regulation threatened to bring about
the demise of free, over-the-air commercial television, which
would not sit well with the public. Hence, during the 1980s and
1990s, the "7-7-7" rule that guided the industry for close to four
decades and the "one to a market" rule that prevailed for more
than half a century were relegated to mere footnotes of history,
giving way to the creation of mega-dynasties in radio and
television, with the largest companies now owning over 1,000
12 See e.g., Beatrice E. Garcia, High-Speed Service Changing Web Usage, Study Says,
THE MIAMI HERALD, June 24, 2002, at 14A (citing study by Pew Internet and American
Life Project that found that extra time consumers with broadband are spending online "is
coming at the expense of television and the print media").
13 In June 2002 cable networks claimed a 54.0 prime time share for the month,
compared with a 38.4 share for the major broadcast networks. This marked the first time
in history that cable surpassed a 50 share in prime time. See Allison Romano, Cable
Breaks 50-Share Mark in Prime, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jul. 8, 2002, at 12.
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radio stations or television stations that reach more than 40% of
the nation's television homes.] 4
From a competitive standpoint, the coming of age of the
multivideo universe has, in fact, put free, over-the-air
commercial television at a serious disadvantage. This
marketplace shift has led to a corresponding shift of the
regulatory paradigm from regulation to promotion of competition
across industries within the video marketplace. As a
consequence, certain regulatory barriers were removed first by
Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and thereafter
by the FCC-on the theory that the public interest would better
be served by more vibrant inter-industry competition. The intent
was to place the broadcast industry on a more level playing field.
The relaxation of ownership rules, aimed at attaining better
balance, has fueled a trend toward consolidation to better
position such inter-industry competition. At the same time, easy
access to public money in the 1980s and 1990s made
maximization of shareholder values the ultimate goal,
supplanting governmental imprimatur as the standard by which
to measure successful operation. In the process, a radio industry
once owned by many smaller companies and individuals came to
be dominated by a handful of previously unimaginably large
players. The television marketplace as well has seen a less than
subtle shift in the balance of power from the local affiliates and
program suppliers to the networks.
Against this backdrop have come two recent decisions, Fox
Television Stations v. FCC5 and Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.
v. FCC ,16 in which the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
appears for the first time to have shifted its focus from "public
interest" to "necessity" as the standard by which to evaluate the
rationale behind the few remaining FCC rules that govern the
structural marketplace in the broadcast industry.17 In Fox, the
14 See Stuart A. Shorenstein & Andrew D. Fisher, Media Concentration Rules Are on
Shaky Ground, 226 N. Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 2001, at 1, 6 (stating 7-7-7 rule limited single entity
to no more than 7 AM, 7 FM and 7 television stations nationwide and one-to-a-market
rule prevented single owner from owning both radio and television station in same
market).
15 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
16 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
17 See Sinclair Broadcast Group, 284 F.3d at 165 (holding FCC failed to demonstrate
that exclusion of non-broadcast media from eight voices exception was necessary in public
interest); Fox Television, 280 F.3d at 1043 (stating FCC failed to show NTSO rule was
2003]
50 ST JOHN'S JOURAAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
court found that the FCC's 35% national ownership cap for
television was arbitrary and capricious.18 In Sinclair, the court
found that the FCC had also been arbitrary and capricious in
adopting a rule that would allow the creation of television
duopolies, but only in those markets in which eight
independently owned broadcast television stations would
remain. 19 In both cases the court remanded the affected rules to
the FCC for ,justification, amendment or elimination. 20
Significantly, in neither case did the court find that adoption of
such rules would be per se unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds. Rather, the courts determined that there was
insufficient record support for adoption of either rule under the
standards set by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, which required that FCC ownership rules be shown to be
"necessary in the public interest."21
Assuming that these decisions are not overturned on appeal, it
appears that a new paradigm may well emerge in which the
multivideo universe will become the relevant market for
measuring diversity and competition, not the broadcast industry
standing alone. Furthermore, at least with respect to ownership
rules, these decisions strongly suggest a new and narrower
emphasis on the necessity of the Commission's regulation as the
proper test under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, rather
than the broader "public interest" standard that might have been
applied to a different kind of rule or in an earlier era.
necessary in public interest to safeguard competition or enhance diversity).
18 See Fox Television, 280 F.3d at 1044 (holding FCC decision to retain NTSO rule
arbitrary and capricious).
19 See Sinclair Broadcast Group, 284 F.3d at 152 (stating FCC failed to demonstrate
that exclusion of non-broadcast media in the eight voices exception was not arbitrary and
capricious).
20 In the Fox Television decision the court also struck down the FCC's rules
restricting cable television and broadcast television station cross-ownership in a single
market as beyond repair, even if not necessarily unconstitutional (though the court
allowed that it might be, given the different standards that have been established for
review of rules pertaining to cable). See Fox Television, 280 F.3d at 1049-53.
21 See Sinclair Broadcast Group, 284 F.3d at 159 (stating court's review was informed
by Congress's instruction in Telecommunications Act that FCC shall repeal or modify any
regulation found to no longer be in public interest); Fox Television, 280 F.3d at 1033
(stating Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires FCC to review ownership rules every
two years to determine if such rules are necessary in public interest).
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Fox Television v. FCC
It is hardly surprising that News Corp.'s Fox Television
provided the impetus for the court's interpretation of the new
regulatory standard mandated under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. Rupert Murdoch's bold entry into American
television little more than a decade earlier with the acquisition of
a group of stations and the launch of the Fox network had
fundamentally changed the business, paving the way for future
upstarts like UPN and the WB. Murdoch's global strategic focus
on platform development and securing distribution22 depended in
part on challenging protective regulations that had grown up
around the television establishment. Though American and
British broadcast traditions had developed along very different
lines, Murdoch's description of his approach to bringing Sky
Television to Great Britain is not all that different from his
approach to bringing Fox to the United States: 'When we
launched Sky Television, we had to cut through a thicket of rules,
regulations and customs that were designed to preserve the
broadcast monopoly-or, by then, duopoly-that had existed for
decades. Through perseverance, and at considerable expense, we
have been able to do that."23 As a result, in both the United
States and Britain, Murdoch saw News Corp. as "a huge
guarantor of continued competition for generations." 24
At issue in Fox Television v. FCC were national limits on
television station ownership, regulations that had changed not at
all in the first four decades of television's growth and only
relatively slowly thereafter. 25 Since the 1940s the FCC had
imposed rules that placed limits on the number of television
stations one party could own nationwide. The number seven,
adopted in 1954 as the national cap for AM, FM and television,
held for thirty years.26 In 1984 the Commission, in what in
hindsight seems a modest move but at the time marked a major
22 See WENDY GOLDMAN ROHM, THE MURDOCH MISSION: THE DIGITAL
TRANSFORMATION OF A MEDIA EMPIRE 237 (John Wiley & Sons 2002)
23 See id. at 22.
24 See id. at 262
25 See Shorenstein & Fisher, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that television station
ownership rules of Communications Act of 1934 were strictly enforced for decades).
26 See id. at 1 (stating 1954 FCC rules prohibiting common ownership of more than 7
FM, 7 AM and 7 television stations remained unchanged for 30 years).
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policy shift, increased the national caps for AM, FM and TV from
seven to 12.27 Shortly thereafter, and only for television, the
Commission added a rule that would prohibit any one owner,
whether or not it had reached the 12-station limit, from owning
stations that reached more than 25% of the nation's television
households 28
Over the next decade, the FCC continued to relax its rules on
radio ownership. However, the limits on national television
station ownership remained at 12 stations and 25% of national
audience until Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of
1996. The first wholesale amendment of the Communications
Act of 1934, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (as interpreted
by the court in Fox Television) required the FCC to modify not
only the specifics of its television ownership rules, but also its
whole approach to ownership regulation. 29 In the 1996 Act,
Congress ordered the FCC to modify its rules to eliminate its
numerical limits on national ownership of television stations
altogether and to up its audience cap to 35%.30 More important,
Congress also ordered a biennial Commission review of all
ownership rules.3 1 Under the new law, the biennial review was to
be utilized by the Commission to "determine whether any of such
rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of
competition"32 and to "repeal or modify any regulation it
determines to be no longer in the public interest."33 This
language was the basis for the court's remand in Fox
Television34.
In Fox Television, the court considered consolidated petitions
by Fox, NBC, CBS and Viacom arising from the FCC's first
27 See Shorenstein & Fischer, supra note 14, at 6 (stating FCC established 12 station
limit in 1984 in response to growth in mass media market).
28 See id. (stating FCC established "audience reach cap" limiting ownership interests
in television stations to maximum of 25 percent of national television audience).
29 See Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating
Telecommunications Act of 1996 began process of deregulating organization of broadcast
and cable television).
30 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, §§
202(c)(1)(A), (B) (directing FCC to modify rules for multiple ownership by eliminating
numerical limit on national television station ownership and by increasing national
audience reach limitation to 35 percent).
31 See id. at § 202 (h) (directing FCC to review ownership rules biennially).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See Fox Television, 280 F.3d at 1043 (holding Commission failed to adduce valid
reason why NTSO rule was necessary in public interest).
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biennial review of ownership rules in 1998.35 The FCC's decision
not to repeal or modify the national television station ownership
rule (NTSO Rule), among others, argued Fox, violated the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), and the First Amendment. 36 Interestingly, the
television industry's powerful trade organization, the National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB), and the Network Affiliated
Stations Alliance (NASA) found themselves allied against the
networks and with the Consumer Federation of America (CFA)
and the Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ
(UCC), interveners filing briefs in support of the Commission's
decision to retain its rules.37 That the networks and the NAB
found themselves on opposite sides of the issue is indicative of
the complexities raised by the FCC's ownership rules, which
protect some station owners and stand as obstacles to the
ambitions of others. The division over ownership issues
prompted all the major networks but ABC to bolt the NAB, which
took the position favored by many network affiliates concerned
over their viability in a consolidating market.
The court traced the history of technological change that had
led the Commission to modify its ownership rules in 1984. The
court noted that in 1984 the Commission itself had determined
that repeal of the NTSO Rule "would not adversely affect either
the diversity of viewpoints available on the airwaves or
competition among broadcasters," concluding that diversity was a
local concern to which the NTSO Rule was "irrelevant," and had
expressed its intention to sunset its newly adopted national
television ownership numerical cap of 12 after a six-year
transition period.38 However, Congress blocked implementation
35 See id. at 1036 (citing 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review, Biennial Review Report,
15 F.C.C.R. 11058, 2000 WL 791562 (2000)). Fox, NBC, Viacom and CBS had challenged
FCC's decision not to modify or repeal national television station ownership rule, which
would prevent Fox from going forward with purchase of stations from Chris-Craft that
would boost Fox's national audience reach to over 40 percent and would threaten Viacom's
ability to keep stations it had acquired when it purchased CBS.
36 See id at 1033 (stating petitioners challenged FCC decision not to repeal national
television station ownership rule on grounds that decision violated Administrative
Procedure Act, Telecommunications Act and First Amendment).
37 See id. (stating National Association of Broadcasters filed briefs in support of
Commission's decision to retain ownership rule).
38 See id. at 1034 (citing Amendment of Multiple Ownersi'p Rules, Report & Order,
100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984)).
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of the FCC's 1984 proposal, 39  and the Commission on
reconsideration modified its rules to add the 25% audience cap
and to retain indefinitely the numerical limit of 12 stations,
which it had originally intended only as an interim solution.40
In defending its 1998 decision to retain the 35% national
audience cap ordered by Congress in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, the Commission argued that it should not repeal the rule
in a time of transition. The Commission claimed that before it
repealed the 35% cap, it needed time: (1) to observe the effects of
recent changes to the rules governing local ownership of
television stations; (2) to observe the effects of the increase in the
national ownership cap to 35%; and (3) to preserve the power of
affiliates in bargaining with networks. 41 In addition, the
Commission argued that repealing the rule would only increase
concentration in the national advertising market and the
program production market. 42 The networks countered that these
justifications were inadequate to show that the rule was
"necessary in the public interest," as required by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.43
39 See id. at 1034 (citing Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No 98-396,
§ 304, 98 Stat. 1369, 1423 (1984)).
40 See Fox Television, 280 F.3d at 1034 (citing Amendment of Multiple Ownerslip
Rules, Mem. Op. & Order, 100 F.C.C. 2d 74, 90-92 (1984)). It has often been noted that
the FCC's concept of "public interest" shifts over time as different Commissioners,
appointed by different administrations and approved by different legislators, give their
own meaning to this flexible mandate. In this case the Commission had attempted to
justify eliminating national ownership caps in 1984, during the aggressively deregulatory
Reagan administration, and had been thwarted by the opposition party in Congress.
Years later, the pendulum having swung back toward more regulation during successor
Commissions and eight years of a Democratic administration, the "public interest"
findings of its predecessor came back to haunt a successor Commission as the court
scrutinized these apparent inconsistencies. In arguing for repeal of the rule, the networks
claimed the Commission had failed to explain its rationale in departing from its earlier
position that the national limits should be repealed.
41 See id. at 1042 (indicating Commission offered three specific reasons for its
retention of NTSO rule, all three of which failed).
42 See id. at 1036 (stating Commission also believed repealing rule would "increase
concentration in the national advertising market").
43 The networks sought to bolster their argument against a 35 percent audience cap
by referencing a decision months earlier of the D.C. Circuit Court that found that a 30
percent cap on cable ownership a violation of the First Amendment. See Time Warner
Entertainment Co., L.P.. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (2001) (holding FCC failed to met its
burden under First Amendment). While the court agreed with the networks that
television stations face more local competition than do cable systems, the court found that
the standard under which it reviewed cable regulation (intermediate scrutiny) was more
demanding than the arbitrary and capricious standard under the APA. Moreover, the
court noted that Congress had limited the FCC's authority to impose regulations on cable
solely to further diversity in programming. Therefore, while the court agreed that the
cable decision offered a "point of reference," it did not find the case controlling with
[Vol. 17:45
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According to the networks, there is no evidence that
broadcasters have undue market power in any relevant market.44
Therefore the Commission's stated goal of safeguarding
competition was unsupported. On this point the court agreed,
calling the Commission's claim of a need to protect competition in
either the national program market or the national advertising
market "wholly unsupported and undeveloped."45 While the court
did not accept the networks' further contention that diversity
alone could not justify ownership regulation as "necessary in the
public interest," it agreed with the networks that the
Commission had failed to justify why the NTSO Rule served the
interest of diversity.46 The Commission had never explained why
it was no longer adhering to its 1984 finding that national
diversity is irrelevant. Further, "the Commission's passing
reference to national diversity does nothing to explain why the
Rule is necessaryto further that end."4 7
The Commission tried to justify the 35% cap as a tool for
allowing future observation of the effects of its relaxation of local
ownership rules. But the court said it could find no "obvious"
relationship between the national cap and the local ownership
rule and the Commission had not provided any evidence of a
"non-obvious" relationship. 48 More important, the court agreed
with the networks that Congress had not intended that the FCC
retain a rule to see whether it might become useful. "The
Commission's wait-and-see approach cannot be squared with its
statutory mandate promptly-that is, by revisiting the matter
biennially-to 'repeal or modify' any rule that is not 'necessary in
the public interest."'49 Nor did it matter that Congress itself had
set the 35% cap in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; it did so
as a "starting point from which the Commission was to assess the
need for further change."50 Furthermore, the Commission's claim
respect to broadcast television regulations. See Fox Television, 280 F. 3d at 1040-41.
44 See Fox Television, 280 F.3d at 1041 (stating networks argued that broadcasters
have no undue market power that would dampen competition).
45 Id. at 1042.
46 See id. (providing two reasons why FCC's diversity justification failed).
47 Id. (emphasis added).
48 See id. (stating there is no obvious relationship between relaxation of local
ownership rule and retention of the national ownership cap and the Commission offered
nothing to suggest a non-obvious relationship).
49 Fox Television, 280 F.3d at 1042.
50 Id. at 1043.
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that retaining the rule was necessary to strengthen the
bargaining power of network affiliates, thus promoting diversity
of programming, even if relevant, was nowhere supported in the
record. In fact, the court noted, this assertion ran counter to the
Commission's 1984 finding that it had "no evidence indicating
that stations which are not group-owned better respond to
community needs, or expend proportionately more of their
revenues on local programming."51 "The Commission may, of
course, change its mind, but it must explain why it is reasonable
to do so."52 Because the Commission "has adduced not a single
valid reason to believe the NTSO Rule is necessary in the public
interest, either to safeguard competition or to enhance
diversity,"53 the NTSO Rule was found to be arbitrary and
capricious in violation of the APA54 and was remanded to the
FCC.
Sinclair Broadcast Group v. FCC
Scarcely more than a month after the Court of Appeals
remanded the NTSO Rule to the Commission, it did the same
with the Commission's local television ownership rule in Sinclair
Broadcast Group v. FCC.55 As in Fox Television, the court was
harshly critical of the Commission's failure to explain how its
local ownership rule, which only allowed television duopolies
under specific circumstances, was "necessary in the public
interest."56 As one industry trade publication put it, with Sinclair
following so closely on the heels of Fox Television, the FCC
appeared to be "beating a path to the woodshed with the D.C.
Court of Appeals holding it firmly by the ear."5 7
In Sinclair, as in Fox, the court was asked to consider whether
the FCC had met the 1996 statutory mandate in framing new
rules on local television duopolies. Rules adopted by the FCC in
1999 for the first time allowed common ownership of two
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1044-45.
53 Id. at 1043.
54 See id. (concluding 1998 FCC decision to retain NTSO rule was arbitrary and
capricious and in violation of Administrative Procedure Act).
55 284 F.3d 148, 152 (DC Cir. 2002) (remanding local ownership rule to FCC).
56 See id. at 165 (holding Commission failed to show that exclusion of non-broadcast
media from eight voices exception was necessary in public interest).
57 Scarcity of Rationales, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 8, 2001 at 82.
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television stations in the same market, but only if one of the
stations was not among the four highest rated stations in the
market and only if eight independently owned, full-power,
operational television stations remained in the market.58 Sinclair
Broadcast Group challenged the local ownership rule on several
grounds, one of which was that limiting common ownership of
television stations to local markets with eight independent
broadcast television voices was arbitrary and capricious. 59
The court noted that in 1991 the Commission had issued a
Notice of Inquiry60 concerning relaxation of local television
ownership rules and, a year later, in a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, observed that a minimum of six independently
owned stations would be enough to provide outlets for ABC,
NBC, CBS, Fox and two independents and permit mergers in 38
of the top 50 markets. 61 In a Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in 1995, the Commission sought further guidance
concerning the number (if any) of independent voices that should
remain in a market after the creation of a television duopoly and
suggested that cable ought to be counted among those
independent voices. 62 Before the Commission acted on the
matter, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
directing the FCC to conduct a rulemaking to determine whether
to retain, modify or eliminate its television local ownership
limits. 63 When in 1999 the Commission adopted the rule at issue
in Sinclair, it opted for a minimum of eight independent voices
and excluded from consideration as "voices" any media but full-
service broadcast television stations. 64 In so doing, Sinclair
58 See Sinclair Broadcast Group, 284 F.3d at 152 (citing Review of the Commission's
Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Report and Order, FCC 99-209 (rel. Aug.
6, 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 50,651 (Sept. 17, 1999), on recons., FCC 00-431, (rel. Jan. 19,
2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 9039 (Feb. 6, 2001) (codified at 47 C.F. R.§ 73.3555(b) (2002)).
59 See id. (stating Sinclair challenged ownership rule on three grounds, one of which
was that rule was arbitrary and capricious).
60 See id. (citing Review of the Policy Implications of the Changing Video
Marketplace, Notice of Inquiry, FCC 91-215 (rel. Aug. 7, 1991), 56 Fed.Reg. 40,847 (Aug.
16, 1991)).
61 See id. (citing Review of the Comzmssion's Regulations Governing Television
Broadcasting, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 92-209 (rel. June 12, 1992), 57 Fed.
Reg. 28.163 (June 24, 1992)).
62 See id. (citing Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television
Broadcasting, Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, FCC 94-322 (Rel. Jan. 17, 1995),
60 Fed.Reg. 6,490 (Feb. 2, 1995)).
63 See id. (citing 1996 Act, §202(c)(2)).
64 See Sinclair Broadcast Group, 284 F.3d at 152-55 (discussing basis for
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argued, the Commission "plucked the number eight out of thin
air" and arbitrarily defined "voices," excluding media that it had
included as "voices" for purposes of its radio-television cross-
ownership rule.65 The Commission explained that it had limited
"voices" to broadcast stations in the absence of definitive
empirical studies quantifying the extent to which the various
media are substitutable in local markets. 66 As in Fox, the court
refused to accept the absence of critical studies as a justification
for a rule limiting ownership. "This 'wait-and-see' approach...
cannot be squared with [the FCC's] statutory mandate.., to
'repeal or modify' any rule that is not 'necessary in the public
interest."'67 Accordingly, the court remanded the rule to the
Commission for further consideration, holding that the definition
of "voices" in the local ownership rule was arbitrary and
capricious. 68
THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST, CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY STANDARD
In neither Fox nor Sinclair did the Court of Appeals find that
rules limiting television ownership, nationally or locally, were
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. Nor did the court
find that the broad concept of "diversity" was an impermissible
goal for the FCC to further with ownership rules. However, in
both cases, the court ruled that the Telecommunications Act of
1996 demanded far more than broad theories about the benefits
of diversity or competition to justify ownership regulations.
Just how much evidence will be enough to meet the new
"necessity" standard set by Congress? That remains to be seen.
In 2001 (prior to the Court of Appeals' decisions remanding
either the NTSO Rule or the local ownership rule), FCC
Chairman Michael Powell recognized the difficult job the FCC
Commission's decision to choose eight independent voices and its reasons for excluding
media other than full service broadcast television stations).
65 See id at 158-159 (emphasis added) (emphasizing petitioner's contention that
Commission did not properly support its position).
66 See id at 164 (emphasis added) (explaining that Commission's rationale for
limiting voices to broadcast television involved unresolved question about extent to which
non-broadcasting alternatives were accessible).
67 Id. at 164 (emphasis added) (citing Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027,
1042 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
68 See id. at 169 (holding that definition of voices in local ownership rule was
arbitrary and capricious and remanding rule to FCC for further consideration).
[Vol. 17:45
DEFINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
would have justifying, much less crafting, ownership regulations
that meet stricter court scrutiny:
"I think that the foundation of the media regulatory
environment is on shaky sand. And increasingly the courts
are putting a rigorous and scrutinizing eye [on this] and are
asking the Commission to justify with much greater rigor
than it'g been capable of, why it's imposing these kinds of
restrictions. "69
Circuit Judge Sentelle, concurring in part and dissenting in
part in Sinclair, suggested the kind of justification he would
demand as he explained why he would have vacated, rather than
simply remanded, the local ownership rule. Even though
"diversity" and its effects are "elusive concepts, not easily
defined,"70 wrote Judge Sentelle, "[p]urporting to promote
'diversity' does not give the agency a free pass."71
The Commission should define its diversity goal, and in
doing so explain the distinctions (and interaction) between
programming diversity and viewpoint diversity, rather than
simply quoting boilerplate on the "elusiveness" of diversity.
Even accepting for the moment that the FCC could regulate
in the name of diversity without further elucidating that
goal, it must still, at a minimum, explain how its rule
furthers diversity .... Were the goal merely to preserve
competition, the FCC could readily apply the Department of
Justice/Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Merger
Guidelines. It declined to do so, apparently because its
"diversity requirements" are a different goal than
competition per se ... Therefore, the FCC must at least
make some effort at showing how its Local Ownership Rule
furthers diversity in the local market-because it is
purporting to regulate to protect local diversity.
.... Because the Commission has failed to justify
affirmatively the need for any duopoly rule, with or without
an eight voices exception, I would vacate the Local
69 Shorenstein & Fischer, supra note 14, at 6 (emphasis added) (quoting Chairman
Powell, interviewed on "The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer," Transcript number 7129 (Aug.
9, 2001)).
70 Sinclair Broadcast Group, 284 F.3d, at 169-170 (Sentelle, J., concurring and
dissenting in part).
71 Id. at 170.
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Ownership Rule. 72
Reacting to the Fox Television and Sinclair decisions, the FCC
has accused the court of "interpreting the congressional mandate
too rigidly."73 There may be merit to the FCC's claim. After all,
the language of §202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
requires that the Commission biennially "determine whether any
of [its ownership] rules are necessary in the public interest," but
only requires the Commission to repeal or modify regulations "it
determines to be no longer in the public interest."74 Given the
fluidity with which the Commission, the courts and even the
Congress have used and interpreted "public interest" over the
years, and the absence of either an unambiguous legislative
direction as to the implications of or prior court interpretation of
the phrase "necessary in the public interest," it could be argued
that the D. C. Circuit is making too much of the insertion of
"necessary" into one, but not both sentences of this section of the
statute. As critics have suggested, the breadth and vagueness of
"the public interest, convenience and necessity" may have led the
courts to uphold broad FCC interpretations in some instances,
but the very breadth of the standard also has invited broad court
interpretations that a more precisely drafted statute might not
have invited or allowed. 75 Under this theory, perhaps the Court
of Appeals in Fox and Sinclair did indeed go farther toward
applying the rigors of "necessity" than Congress had intended.
However, the legislative history of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 provides support for the court's insistence that "necessary
in the public interest" is indeed a stricter standard than the
"public interest" as it heretofore has been interpreted.
Commentators have noted the "virtually universal agreement"76
at the time of the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
on the need to encourage competition and to promote
marketplace solutions. "Major new legislation generally needs
72 Id. at 170-72 (emphasis added).
73 See generally Bill McConnell, Reg review is spring-loaded, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, July 15, 2002, 42 at 44.
74 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202 (h), 110 Stat. 56, 110
(1996) (emphasis added).
75 See May, supra note 8, at 448 (illustrating elusive nature of amorphous concept
known as "public interest").
76 Byrnes, supra note 2, at 54.
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one basic concept on which there is broad agreement, "77 and in
1996, that concept was competition. A little like their
counterparts in the Roaring Twenties, legislators in the mid-
1990s were pumped up with the advances of technology and the
surging stock market. The American confidence in business and
consumerism that sent Calvin Coolidge to the White House and
paved the way for the industry conferences that led to the
passage of the Radio Act of 1927 are the lens through which
"public interest, convenience and necessity" ought to have been
viewed all along, some would argue. Seen through that lens, the
public interest is best served by creating and promoting an
economically robust and technically advanced private radio
industry subject only to such regulations as are necessary to
promote investment and innovation. 78 Certainly, the Congress
that passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was controlled
by a majority as convinced as their 1920's counterparts that the
public interest would in most cases be served better by free
market competition than by regulatory intervention. 79
Perhaps the Communications Act of 1934 was not the reason
that established communications companies had become so
entrenched, and the FCC so often had become the protector of the
77 Id. at 54.
78 See generally Willard D. Rowland, The Meaning of "the Public Interest" in
Communications Policy-Part I" Its Implementation in Early Broadcast Law and
Regulation, 2 COMM. L. & POL'Y 363, 366-67 (1997) (describing President Coolidge's
statement "the business of America is business" as capturing the core spirit of America in
1920s).
79 It should be noted that marketplace solutions have been favored not just by
members of Congress but also by FCC Commissioners of both parties, both before and
after the chairmanship of Mark Fowler during the Reagan administration, in which
deregulation may have reached its zenith. After it found itself on the losing side of the
issue in 1970's court cases that would pave the way for competition in the telephone
business, the FCC, chaired by Carter appointee and Democrat Charles Ferris, had
already begun serious deregulation before Fowler came on the scene. Harold W.
Furchtgott-Roth (a Republican Commissioner appointed by a Democratic President, Bill
Clinton), who often dissented from the decisions of a Commission led by Democrat
William Kennard, said of the art of writing good regulations: "Regulatory agencies
sometimes become ambivalent about markets and at times delude themselves into
believing that regulation can 'create' or 'improve' a market. Regulation rarely, if ever,
does either." See Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, The Art of Wrting Good Regulations, 53
FED. COMM. L. J. 1-4, 3 (2000). Commissioner Kathleen Abernathy, appointed by
President George W. Bush in 2001 to a Commission headed by fellow Republican Michael
Powell, echoed the new Chairman's avowed preference for limited regulation: "[Flully
functioning markets deliver better products and services to consumers as compared to
markets regulated by the government.., government should be reluctant to intervene in
the marketplace." Kathleen Q. Abernathy, My View from the Doorstep of FCC Change, 54
FED. COMM. L. J. 199, 200 (2002).
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status quo. However, according to one historian discussing the
climate in which the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was
hammered out, "if the 1934 Act was not the villain of the piece, it
had become the enabler.., bureaucratic tendencies in agencies
only interfered with the ability of the market to adjust to
dislocations.., as competition began to take root in the
marketplace, it became appropriate to consider whether specific
regulatory practices of the past continued to be needed." 80 While
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 may have specified no
precise formula for just what factual record would be sufficient to
justify retaining an ownership rule, the court took as its premise
that the framers of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 vastly
preferred the marketplace over regulation and had mandated a
biennial review of existing rules as a way to weed them out.
Congress had expressed a "presumption in favor of repealing or
modifying the ownership rules,"81 in keeping with its " vision of a
telecommunications marketplace where the flexibility and
innovation of competition replaces the heavy hand of
regulation."82 As the court put it in Fox Television, "[T]he
mandate of §202(h) might better be likened to Farragut's order at
the battle of Mobile Bay ("Damn the torpedoes! Full speed
ahead.") than to the wait-and-see attitude of the
Commission. .. "83 Thus, concluded the court, "The statute is
clear that a regulation should be retained only insofar as it is
necessary in, not merely consonant with, the public interest."84
The new emphasis on "necessity" as the proper standard for
FCC ownership rules comes at a time when the broad character
and content considerations that the FCC had undertaken in the
"public interest" have been dealt repeated and significant blows.
Comparative hearings have been replaced by auctions as the
basis for granting new broadcast licenses, and under the terms of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, license renewal applicants
have achieved substantial protection from challengers. Both
these developments have significantly narrowed the
80 Byrnes, supra note 2, at 53.
81 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
82 Michael I. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to the 1996
Telecommunications Act, 49 FED. COMM. L. J. 251, 252 (1997).
83 Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
84 Id. at 1050 (emphasis added).
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circumstances in which the FCC might find itself tempted or
compelled to interpret "public interest, convenience and
necessity" too broadly as a basis for licensing decisions or in
furthering desirable programming, which were presumed in an
earlier period of the industry's development to be served by now
defunct comparative criteria like integration of ownership and
management, ascertainment of community needs and minimum
news and public affairs program percentages.
As the Court of Appeals noted in both FoA85 and Sinclai8 6, the
Supreme Court has not yet abandoned the scarcity rationale:
"ITihe Supreme Court has already heard the empirical case
against that rationale and still declined to question its
continuing validity."87 Judge Sentelle, who would have vacated
rather than remanded the local ownership rule in Sinclair,
expressed his thoughts on the scarcity rationale:
While there may be merit to petitioner's argument that the
"diversity" rationale is essentially content-based, and that
therefore heightened scrutiny should be implicated, that
argument has been rejected... Therefore, the FCC can
effectively prescribe a limit on the amount of speech a person
may engage in through broadcast media because a person is
prohibited from engaging in more speech (through a second
station) if she owns (or programs more than 15% of the
content of) another station. Perhaps with now-Chairman
Powell's announcement that the "time has come to
reexamine First Amendment jurisprudence as it has been
applied to broadcast media and bring it into line with the
realities of today's communications marketplace," the
Supreme Court will take notice... That being said, this
Court is "stuck with the scarcity doctrine until the day that
the Supreme Court tells us that the Red Lion no longer rules
the broadcast jungle. ..88
Therefore, the Court of Appeals would not (or could not) throw
out the scarcity rationale; "even if we agree that it no longer
makes sense ... it is not the province of this court to determine
85 Id. at 1046.
86 Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
87 Fox Television, 280 F.3d 1046 (citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 638 (1994)); see also Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 161 (stating Supreme Court has
refused to abandon scarcity rationale).
88 Fox Television, 284 F.3d at 172.
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when a prior decision of the Supreme Court has outlived its
usefulness."89 Nonetheless, questions abound as to the continued
vitality of the scarcity rationale as a theoretical basis for
regulating broadcast content or structure. Most cities have but
one daily newspaper and dozens of broadcast stations and other
electronic media.
In the public utility law tradition from which "public interest,
convenience and necessity" arose, the burden of showing
"necessity" was on the applicant who wanted to start a new
service. This was based on a presumption against competition.
In the new regime created by the Telecommunications Act of
1996, that old concept of necessity has been turned on its head-
competition is presumed to be good, and regulation allowed only
as a "necessity" where it is shown that the marketplace cannot
produce desired results. To survive the D.C. Circuit's scrutiny
under the 1996 statute, ownership rules will have to be shown to
be "necessary" in the public interest, not just "consonant" with
the public interest. Therefore, in the aftermath of Fox and
Sinclair, "necessity," rather than "public interest," may well
become the modern standard under which future FCC rules will
be judged. The Commission itself acknowledged this to be the
court's interpretation of the standard set by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 in its comprehensive
rulemaking re-examining media concentration and ownership. 90
However, the Commission questioned whether the court had
captured the intent of Congress or had elevated the bar of
necessity well above the level Congress had meant to set in
section 202(h) of the 1996 statute and sought comment on what
the standard should be.91 How the FCC and ultimately the courts
define this new standard will be closely watched to see if a new
regulatory paradigm in fact emerges.
Among the biggest ironies is that for years it was broadcasters
who sought to free themselves from the burdens of regulation.
The NAB, one of the most powerful lobbying groups in the
89 Fox Television, 284 F.3d. at 1046 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237
(1997)).
90 FCC 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 67
Fed. Reg. 65,751, 1 18 (Proposed Sept. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
Id.
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country, over the course of several decades successfully
championed the notion of deregulation, or, better yet,
unregulation. However, when the balance of power in the
industry shifted to the networks from independently owned
affiliates, the NAB found itself caught in the switches. Rather
than sit on the sidelines of a major industry battle, to protect the
majority of its members, the NAB sought to preserve structural
rules such as the ownership caps that the networks sought to
eliminate. Having argued for so long against regulations that
strangled the industry, broadcasters found the court unreceptive
to their arguments that ownership regulations were now
"necessary" to protect the public interest. This new mantra will
inevitably lead us toward a broader definition of market where
competitors are driven by the marketplace to capture eyeballs
through whatever technological means are available, instead of
the manner in which facilities are licensed and regulated by the
government. The single signal of a non-subscriber-based, over-
the-air commercial television station may even be seen to be at
such a competitive disadvantage in a multi-channel video
universe that the justification for structural limitations on the
industry will disappear entirely. Ironically, broadcasters may
finally emerge victorious over the FCC's regulatory framework.
But the victory will be Pyrrhic if the nation's broadcasters find
themselves unable to hold onto their share of a fragmented
market or, worse yet, are swallowed by an old nemesis like cable
TV.
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